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This response and answer is submitted to Appellees' 
Petition for Rehearing as requested by the Court of Appeals. 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Ordering that the 
Judgment be Reformed Because the Trial Court Employed an 
Improper Measure of Damages. 
In its memorandum decision, this Court correctly held 
that the trial court erred in determining the amount of benefit 
conferred by plaintiffs on defendants. As this court noted, the 
trial court improperly based its conclusion of law regarding 
damages on the amount invested by plaintiffs, rather than on the 
value of the benefit conferred on defendants. 
Such an error by the trial court is the only possible 
source of the $180,000.00 figure contained in its conclusions of 
law. One of the court's findings of fact was that "approximately 
$180,000.00 was paid directly or indirectly to defendants by 
plaintiffs." (R. 582). The court then translated this figure, 
which equalled the exact total of the various sums it found 
plaintiffs had invested in the venture, into a conclusion of law 
regarding the value of the benefits plaintiffs conferred on 
defendants. In doing so, the court failed to employ the proper 
measure of damages for an action based on unjust enrichment, which 
is "the value of the benefit conferred on the defendant (the 
defendant's gain), and not the detriment incurred by the plain-
tiff." Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah. App. 1987). This 
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Court was thus correct in holding that the trial court erred in 
calculating the amount of the judgment. 
B. Even if the Trial Court Attempted to Employ the Proper 
Measure of Damages, Its Failure to Make Requisite 
Findings of Fact is Reversible Error. 
In their petition for Rehearing, plaintiffs seem to argue 
that it is just a coincidence that the $180,000.00 benefit which 
the trial court concluded was conferred on defendants matches 
precisely the amount the court found plaintiffs invested in the 
venture. Seizing on two particular items of damages they un-
successfully sought to recover at trial, plaintiffs now contend 
that the trial court arrived at the $180,000.00 figure not by 
totalling the amounts plaintiffs invested, but rather by consider-
ing in its conclusions of law certain benefits conferred on 
defendants which the court neglected to detail in its findings of 
fact. This contention advanced to justify the trial court's 
incorrect judgment is both factually and legally untenable. 
First, the argument fails on its face because, even if 
these particular benefits had been conclusively proven at trial to 
have been conferred on defendants (which they were not) , the sum of 
their respective values does not equal the difference between the 
$128,761.00 outlined in the trial court's findings of fact and the 
$180,000.00 specified in its erroneous conclusion of law. Had the 
trial courz in fact been considering the items plaintiffs allege, 
it would have used the amounts identified by plaintiffs to arrive 
at a more precise total of plaintiffs' damages. 
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Moreover, at this stage of the appeal, plaintiffs 
conveniently abandon additional items of alleged damages which they 
claimed previously, so as to come as close as possible to the trial 
court's $180,000.00 figure. Plaintiffs argued at trial that they 
actually conferred on defendants a benefit of $194,469.00. (Ex. 
P-64) . The fact that the trial court used the round number of 
$180,000.00 in its conclusions of law indicates that it was relying 
specifically on the amount the evidence showed had been invested, 
and not on the value of any benefits conferred. 
Furthermore, even if the court understood the proper 
measure of damages, it failed to make specific findings of fact in 
support of the $18 0,000.00 figure. A failure to enter adequate 
findings of fact on material issues may be reversible error. Reid 
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1939). 
Plaintiffs argue that if the facts pertaining to an issue are 
clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in 
favor of the judgment, a failure to make findings of fact on that 
issue is harmless error. Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P. 2d 233, 236 
(Utah 1983). Plaintiffs then conveniently select two particular 
items of damages which they sought at trial, the combined value of 
which happens to roughly approximate the difference between the 
amounts contained in the trial court's findings of fact and in its 
conclusions of law, and draw the conclusion that factual findings 
on these items should simply be implied because the evidence 
pertaining to them was uncontroverted. 
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Even Indulging plaintiffs'" unwarranted assumption that 
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control c: o_e restaurant: was one * ~ms most: vigorously 
contested ty defer_Gar.es at tria defendants presented evidence 
spent, and did not receive a benefit from the goods purchased with 
them. Ccntrarv t Plaintiffs' assertions defendants mainta"* ^ ed a-*-
irem 6 cf plaintiffs' Exhibit 64, not just tht-: iim sun steam table, 
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by bet: 3 " . Eecause of this fact, defendants argued at 
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Included In defendants'' proposed findings of fact only because 
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corollary findings compensating defendants for their deposits to 
the account were also requested, 
C. Plaintiffs7 Arguments Are Based on an Illegitimate 
Reversal of the Burden of Proof. 
As illustrated above, there was substantial evidence 
controverting the benefits plaintiffs alleged to have conferred on 
defendants but which were absent from the trial court's judgment. 
Plaintiffs' recommendation that this Court supply missing elements 
of alleged damages on which the trial court failed to make findings 
is entirely inappropriate. 
The burden of proof in an action for unjust enrichment is 
on the plaintiff to establish the value of the benefit conferred on 
the defendant. See Zitterkopf v. Bradbury, 783 P. 2d 1142, 1144 
(Wyo. 1989); 66 Am. Jr. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 164 
(1973). Plaintiffs' argument that this Court should simply assume 
the requisite findings unless they were sufficiently disproven by 
defendants illegitimately reverses this burden. This Court was 
therefore correct in concluding that the trial court committed 
reversible error by failing to make requisite findings on contro-
verted issues in support of its conclusions of law. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants request that this 
Court deny appellees' Petition for Rehearing. 
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DATED this 4th day of April, 1996, 
Respectfully submitted, 
IDERSON & SMITH, L.C. 
£&_> 
Robert M. Anderson 
Attorneys for Appellants/Defendants 
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